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I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this Panel' is the authority of Congress and the
President on matters that affect foreign affairs, when they disagree. The
question arose in a case argued in the Supreme Court last term, Zivotofsky
v. Clinton.2 Under U.S. law, Consulates in foreign countries are required to
issue a U.S. passport and Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) for
children born abroad to parents who are U.S. citizens.3
Generally, those documents list the country of birth. However, for
children born in Jerusalem, the State Department manual instructs

*
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Y.U. The author served as Counselor on
International Law, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor. I wish to thank Gergana
Halpern, Cardozo 2009, for her assistance with the research for this paper.
I.
A version of this paper was presented on October 26, 2012, at a Panel on Legislative and
Executive Authority when Congress & the President Disagree on Matters that May Affect Foreign
Affairs: Clinton v. Zivotofsky, at International Law Weekend, held in New York City, October 25-27,
2012. The four members of the Panel were Bill Dodge, who served as Counselor on International Law
while the case was in the Supreme Court, and is a professor at the University of California, Hastings
College of Law; Paul Stephan, who served as Counselor during 2006--07 and is a professor at the
University of Virginia Law School, Nathan Lewin, who has represented the petitioners in this case pro
bono since the inception of the case, in September of 2003, and continues to do so, and the author.
2.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012).
3.
22 C.F.R. § 50.2.
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Consulates to enter "Jerusalem," rather than Israel, as the place of birth. 4 In
2002, Congress adopted a law requiring the Consulate to enter "Israel" for
children born in Jerusalem, if the parents so request. 5
The Zivotoftky case involves an action by U.S. parents of a child born
in Jerusalem whose request that the passport and Consular Report of Birth
Abroad list Israel as the place of birth was refused by the U.S. Consul. 6
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ordered the action dismissed. 7
Two judges did so on the ground that it raised a political question. 8 One
judge did not agree that it was a political question, but concurred on the
ground that the legislation unconstitutionally infringed on the President's
power to recognize foreign sovereigns.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 10 Moreover, even though the
petition for certiorari raised only the political question issue, the Court
directed the parties to also address whether the statute "impermissibly
infringes the President's power to recognize foreign sovereigns." 11
The case was argued in the Supreme Court on November 7, 2011. 12
Most of the questions by the Justices focused on the constitutional authority
of Congress to adopt the legislation. The Court did not decide that
question, however. It held eight to one that it was not a political question, 13
but remanded the case to the lower court for a decision on the question it
had asked the parties to address, stating:
Because the District Court and the D.C. Circuit believed that
review was barred by the political question doctrine, we are

4.
Dept. of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual§ 1360, Exh. 1383.1, App. 127; see also id., §§
1360.1, 1360.5-4, .5-5, .5-6, App. 106, 108-10.
5.
Foreign Relations Authori7.ation Act, Fiscal Year 2003, § 214, 107 Pub. L. No. 228, 116
Stat. 1350 (2002).
6.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1425- 26 (2012).
7.
Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (2009). The case was initially brought in
the D.C. District Court, which dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Zivotofsky lacked standing
and that his complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question. See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of
State, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31172 at 9-10 (2004). The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit
reversed, concluding that Zivotofsky did have standing and remanded the case to the District Court. See
Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (2006). The District Court dismissed the complaint
again on the ground that it presented a political question. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97,
103 (2007). The D. C. Circuit affirmed. See Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1232-33.
8.
Judges Griffith and Williams. See Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1233.
9.
Judge Edwards. See Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1240, 1245.
10. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S.Ct. 2897 (2011), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3344, (U.S. May
2, 2011) (No. I 0-699).
II.
Id.
12. Official Transcript of Oral Argument, Zivotofsky, 132 S.Ct. at 1421.
13.
Id.
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without the benefit of thorough lower court opinions to guide our
. o f th e ments.
. t4
analys1s

The case is now again before the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. 15
II. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO
CONDUCT FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The proposition that under the U.S. Constitution the President has the
sole power to conduct foreign affairs has become almost axiomatic. When
I ask students in my Constitution and Foreign Affairs class "in whom does
the Constitution vest the power to conduct foreign affairs," they invariably
respond, year after year, ''the President." When I ask them which clause in
the Constitution so provides, they are amazed to discover that there is no
such clause. The press routinely refers to the position of the President on
foreign affairs matters as the position of United States government, even
when Congress has enacted legislation taking a contrary position, 16 as does
14. Id. at 1430.
15. Zivotofsky, 132 S.Ct. at 1421, on remand No. 07-5347, (D.C. Cir. 2012). It was argued on
March 19, 2013, before a panel of the D.C. Court of Appeals.
16. See, e.g., Section 3 of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 45, 109 Stat.
398 (1995), adopted by a vote of93 to 5 in the Senate, 141 CONG. REC. D 1242-02 (daily ed. Oct. 24,
1995), and 374 to 37 in the House of Representatives, 141 CONG. REC. H 10680 (daily ed. Oct. 24,
1995), stating:
(a) Statement of the Policy of the United States.
(I) Jerusalem should remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic
and religious group are protected;
(2) Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State oflsrael; and
(3) the United States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem no
later than May 3 I, I 999.
(The Act includes a waiver provision permitting the President to postpone moving the embassy if he
believes it would threaten U.S. National Security to do so). Section 214 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 228, 116 Stat. 1350 (2002), entitled United States Policy
with respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel, provides in subsection (c): "none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be available for the publication of any official
government document which lists countries and their capital cities unless the publication identifies
Jerusalem as the capital oflsrael." Yet, newspapers continue to refer to the President's position that the
status of Jerusalem should be determined by negotiations as "U.S. policy" or as the "U.S. Government
position." See Supreme Court: Judges Can Rule on Passport Law, CHIC. TRIB., March 27, 2012 (The
U.S. has long taken the position that sovereignty over Jerusalem ... must be resolved by negotiations ..
. .); Justices Find Pile ofIssues in Passport Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2011 (the official U.S. policy of
neutrality over sovereignty of the holy city). Party to Vote on Sharon 's Proposal to Leave Gaza: Plan
Would Withdraw Settlers and Troops, WASH. POST, April 12, 2004 (past and current U.S. policy ...
holds that ... the status of Jerusalem . . . should be resolved only in direct negotiations between the
Israelis and the Palestinians); Arabs Rip New US. Law on Jerusalem, N.Y. POST, Oct. 2, 2002 ("official
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the President, 17 and as do the Department of Justice briefs in this case. 18
What is the scope of the President's power in foreign affairs when he and
Congress disagree? Is the position of the President the "official position" of
the United States, even when it's contrary to a statute?
Although it has been stated by commentators, the Restatement of U.S.
Foreign Relations Law 19 and judicial decisions, including decisions of the
Supreme Court, that the President has the exclusive power of recognition,
and, even more broadly, the sole power to represent the U.S. in relations
with foreign countries, the Constitution does not explicitly vest those
powers in the President. Indeed, there is no mention in the Constitution of
recognition or of foreign affairs.
III. THE CONSTITUTION GIVES CONGRESS MOST OF THE POWERS THAT
AFFECT FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Constitution does provide for the exercise of a number of powers
that may affect the conduct of foreign affairs. Some of these powers are
vested in Congress, others in the President acting with the advice and
consent of the Senate. None are vested in the President alone. Congress
has the power to declare war, 20 to regulate foreign commerce,21 to oversee
immigration and naturalization,22 and to define and punish piracy and other

U.S. policy is that the status of Jerusalem should be worked out in negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians").
17. After signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2002, supra note 5, which
includes a provision titled "United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel," and
states in section 214(c), "[ nJone of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be available
for the publication of any official government document which lists countries and their capital cities
unless the publication identifies Jerusalem as the capital of lsraef' (emphasis added), the President
reportedly said, "U.S. policy on Jerusalem 'has not changed.' That means the U.S. still officially sees
Jerusalem as a 'permanent-status issue' to be negotiated between the Israelis and the Palestinians in a
final peace accord." See also Although Bush Says He Doesn 't Recognize the Provision. the New US
Law ls Sure to Upset Arabs, CHRIST. SCI. MONIT., Oct 2, 2002.
18. See Brief for the Respondent at 2, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10699) ("for the last 60 years, the United States consistent policy has been to recognize no State as having
sovereignty over Jerusalem"); see Brief for the Appellee at 3, 50, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421
(2012) on remand No. 07-5347 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 2012) ("for the last 60 years, the United States
policy has been to take no official act recognizing Israel's ... claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem"). It
is apparently the position of the Justice Department that laws enacted by Congress are not official acts
of the United States.
19.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 204
(1987).
20.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
21.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22.
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offences against the law of nations. 23 The President has the power to make
treaties and to appoint ambassadors, but both require the advice and consent
of the Senate. 24 As Harold Koh, former Dean of Yale Law School and
presently the Legal Advisor to the State Department, wrote, "Article I gives
Congress almost all the enumerated powers over foreign affairs and Article
II gives the President almost none .... " 25
Nowhere does the Constitution vest any power involving foreign
affairs exclusively in the Executive. The only function of the President
touching on relations with other States referred to in the Constitution that
does not require Senate advice and consent is receiving ambassadors. This
was clearly not intended as a grant of power. As Professor Henkin noted,
receiving ambassadors is not in section two of Article II, which states "[h]e
shall have the power to ... ," but in section three, which states, "[h]e shall
receive ambassadors and other public ministers .. . ,"26 with no mention of
"power."27 Had the provision on receiving ambassadors been intended as a
grant of power, it would have been logical to include it in section two. 28
The drafters of the Constitution did not do so.
Receiving ambassadors was not viewed as an exercise of power by the
framers; it was considered a ministerial function. 29 Hamilton, Madison, and
Jefferson all interpreted the receiving ambassadors clause not as a source of
power but as a ministerial and ceremonial function. 30

23.
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8.
24.
U.S. CONST. art. n, § 2 (The President ... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, ... and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors.).
25.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158, 159 (David Gray Adler &
Larry N. George eds., 1996).
26.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
27.
See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 37-38 (2d
ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
28.
That is, section two would have provided: "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors .. . ;
and he shall receive Ambassadors."
29.
See Robert Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of
Executive Power, 47 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 801 (2010); David Gray Adler, The President's Recognition
Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133-57 (David Gray
Adler and Larry N . George eds., 1996); David Gray Adler, The President 's Recognition Power:
Ministerial or Discretionary? Presidential Studies Quarterly, 267, 268 (1995) (''the reception of
ambassadors was understood as a routine, mechanical function, an almost dutiful act devoid of
discretion .. .. ").
30.
Id.
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Thus, Hamilton wrote, "[i]t is a circumstance that will be without
consequence in the administration of the government."31 Madison wrote:
[L]ittle if anything more was intended by the clause, than to
provide for a particular mode of communication, almost grown
into a right among modem nations; by pointing out the
department of the government most proper for the ceremony of
admitting public ministers, of examining their credentials, and of
authenticating their title to privileges annexed to their character
by the law of nations . . . . That being the apparent design of the
Constitution, it would be highly improper to magnify the function
into an important prerogative, even where no rights of other
departments could be affected by it. 32

Although a recent Supreme Court decision refers to the President's
"exclusive" power of recognition, 33 earlier decisions of the Court, including
one by Chief Justice Marshall, viewed it as a power shared by Congress and
the President. 34 For example, in Jones v. United States, the Court said:
Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a
judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by
the legislative and executive de~artments of any government
conclusively binds the judges .... 5

In the view of such prominent commentators as Story and Rawle,
Congress not only has power of recognition but its power supersedes that of
the President. In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, Story wrote:
If such [executive] recognition is made, it is conclusive upon the
nation, unless indeed it can be reversed by an act of Congress
repudiating it. If, on the other hand, such recognition has been
refused by the executive, it is said, that Congress may,

31. The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (the real character of the executive)
(emphasis added). In the debates over the Neutrality act, Hamilton took a contrary position. See
Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton
33, 41 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969).
32. Adler, supra note 29 (quoting James Madison, Helvidius III., available at
http://forquignon.com/history/american/constitution/helvidius_iii.htm) (last visited July 31, 2013).
33. See Sabatino infra notes 48---49; see also infra text accompanying note 50.
34. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) (issues affecting recognition
are "rather political than legal in their character" and "belong more properly to those who declare what
the law shall be" 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) at 34).
35. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,212 (1890) (emphasis added).
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notwithstanding, solemnly acknowledge the sovereignty of the
nation . ... 36

William Rawle took the same position. He wrote:
The legislature indeed possesses a superior power, and may
declare its dissent from the executive recognition or refusal, but
37
until that sense is declared, the act of the executive is binding.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S BROAD, EVEN EXCLUSIVE, POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS DID
NOT INVOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

Several Supreme Court decisions speak of the President's "power"sometimes "exclusive power"-to conduct foreign affairs. However, none
of these cases involved a conflict between Congress and the President. The
broadest assertion of executive power over foreign affairs is in CurtissWright. 38 Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, stated:
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation . . . . The President is the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
. nations.
.
39
wit. h fiore1gn

However, in that case, there was no conflict between the power of
Congress and that of the President. On the contrary, Congress delegated
power to the President and the question before the Court was whether that
delegation was constitutional.
Under Justice Jackson's analysis in
Youngstown, 40 this is the strongest case for the exercise of executive power
because the President is acting with Congress. As Justice Jackson stated:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate . . . . If his act is held unconstitutional

36.

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1560 (Boston

1833).
37.
States, at 96
38.
39.
40.

William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America AVC United
(Phillip H. Nicklein 2d ed. I 829).
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 319.
See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power .... 41

Moreover, even the broad language in Curtiss-Wright did not state that
the President has exclusive power over matters that affect foreign affairs,
only that "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. ,,4z As Justice Scalia emphasized in questioning
the Solicitor General during oral argument in this case:
[T]o be the sole instrument and to determine the foreign policy
are two quiet different things. He's the instrument, but there is
certainly room in those many cases for saying that Congess can
say ... what the country's instrument is supposed to do.

In United States v. Belmont4 and United States v. Pink,45 the Court
sustained the President's power to settle claims in conjunction with United
States recognition of the Soviet Union. Here, again, there was no conflict
with Congress. Congress has long delegated to the President, either
explicitly or implicitly, the power to settle claims against foreign states. 46
The conflict was with a state law. The Court stated in Belmont:
[The] complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment
or interference on the part of the several states. In respect of all
international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our
47
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.

The opinions in Curtiss-Wright and Belmont were written more than a half
century ago by the same Justice (Sutherland).
In dicta in Sabbatino,48 Justice Harlan stated that "political recognition
is exclusively a function of the Executive.',49 That case also did not involve

41.
Id. at 635-36.
42.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
43.
Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012)
(No. 10-699).
44.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S . 324 (1937).
45.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
46.
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 , 531 (2008) ("making executive agreements to settle
claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a particularly long-standing practice")
(quoting Arn. Ins. Ass. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)); Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981).
47.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (citations omitted).
48.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
49.
Id. at 410.
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any conflict between Congress and the Executive. Rather, it involved
application of the "Act of State" doctrine to enforce a Cuban law even
though it violated international law. The Court reasoned that failure to
apply the Cuban law might embarrass the Executive in the conduct of
foreign affairs. However, when, following that decision, Congress adopted
legislation (the Hickenlooper Amendment)5° providing that the Act of State
Doctrine should not be applied if the foreign act violates international law,
the Court of Appeals applied the statute in that very case. 51 No one
suggested that the legislation unconstitutionally infringed on the President's
power of recognition or the power to conduct foreign affairs. 52
Notwithstanding dicta in decisions of the Supreme Court referring to
the President's broad power over foreign affairs and to his power of
recognition as "exclusive," the Court has never held that the President's
power cannot be limited by Congress exercising its constitutional powers.
When executive action conflicts with congressional action, the power of the
President is at its lowest. In the words of Justice Jackson:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can only rely upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case
only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is
53
the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.

50.
51.
52.

22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
Perhaps the strongest recent statement of broad executive power in foreign affairs,

specifically referring to the President's power to recognize foreign governments, is in Justice Thomas'
dissenting opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S . 557, 679 (2006). It is clear, however, that in his
view this broad executive power exists only when Congress fails to act. He said:
Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs
and national security . . . [but] Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with
regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or
every possible situation in which he might act, . .. [s]uch failure of Congress ...
does not, especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security, imply
congressional disapproval of action taken by the Executive.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
53.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637.
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V. JUSTICE JACKSON'S ANALYSIS IN YOUNGSTOWN STEEL SHOULD
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Supreme Court has never decided which branch has power over
matters that affect foreign affairs when Congress and the President
disagree. It is suggested that Jackson's famous analysis in Youngstown
should apply. That is, when Congress and the President agree, as in CurtisWright,54 the question of which branch has the power does not arise. When
Congress is silent, the President may act by default, as in Belmont55 and
Pink. 56 But, when Congress legislates on a subject over which the
Constitution vests power in Congress, such legislation does not become
unconstitutional because it affects foreign affairs.
In an article entitled Why the President Almost Always Wins in
Foreign Affairs, 57 Koh says,
First, and most obviously, the president has won because the
executive branch has taken the initiative in foreign affairs and has
done so by construing laws designed to constrain his actions as
authorizing them. Second, the president has won because, for all
its institutional activity, Congress has usually complied with or
acquiesced in what he has done, because of legislative myopia,
inadequate drafting, ineffective legislative tools, or sheer lack of
political will. Third, the president has won because the federal
courts have usually tolerated his acts, either by refusing to hear
challenges to those acts or by hearing the challenges and then
affirming his authority on its merits.58

In this case, Congress has not "acquiesced in what the President has
done."59 Congress has adopted legislation requiring the State Department
to change its rules with respect to passports for children born to U.S.
citizens in Jerusalem. However, in an action to implement that legislation,
the District Court60 and two Court of Appeals judges "refus[ed] to hear
challenges"61 to the President's acts and one "affirm[ed] presidential
authority on its merits,',62 the judicial approach described and criticized by
Koh as the third reason why the President almost always wins in foreign
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. at 304.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324.
Pink, 315 U.S. at 203.
Koh, supra note 25.
Id.
See id.
See sources cited in note 7, supra.
See id.
See id.
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affairs. Ironically, as Legal Advisor, Koh urged the Supreme Court to do
exactly that in this case. 63
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reversed eight to one the lower court's refusal to
hear the case. But, even though the Court had requested the parties to
address the merits, and much of the oral argument focused on that, the
Court declined to decide it, saying it did not have "the benefit of ... lower
Court opinions" to guide its analysis on the merits. 64
I think it is regrettable that the Court failed to address the question of
legislative and executive authority on matters that affect foreign affairs. It
is a question of utmost importance today, and one on which commentators
and courts look for guidance to dicta in Supreme Court decisions written
some seventy years ago.

63.
64.

Brief for the Respondent, Zivotofsky, 132 S.Ct. at 1421.
Zivotofsky, 132 S.Ct. at 1430.

